Abstract-We investigate beamforming and artificial noise generation at the secondary transmitters to establish secure transmission in large scale spectrum sharing networks, where multiple noncolluding eavesdroppers attempt to intercept the secondary transmission. We develop a comprehensive analytical framework to accurately assess the secrecy performance under the primary users' quality of service constraint. Our aim is to characterize the impact of beamforming and artificial noise generation (BF&AN) on this complex large scale network. We first derive exact expressions for the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability. We then derive an easy-to-evaluate asymptotic average secrecy rate and asymptotic secrecy outage probability when the number of antennas at the secondary transmitter goes to infinity. Our results show that the equal power allocation between the useful signal and artificial noise is not always the best strategy to achieve maximum average secrecy rate in large scale spectrum sharing networks. Another interesting observation is that the advantage of BF&AN over BF on the average secrecy rate is lost when the aggregate interference from the primary and secondary transmitters is strong, such that it overtakes the effect of the generated AN.
communication devices. To cope with this, unlicensed users are allowed to transmit on the spectrum reserved for the wireless broadband devices as long as the quality of service (QoS) of the primary network is satisfied [2] , [3] . These networks are often referred to as cognitive radio networks (CRNs) .
The open and dynamic characteristics of CRNs have lead to several new classes of security threats and challenges due to opportunistic utilization of licensed channels [4] . There exists six major types of attacks at the physical layer of CRNs, which are commonly known as primary user emulation, objective function attack, learning attack, spectrum sensing data falsification, jamming attack, and eavesdropping [5] . Among them, we focus on the eavesdropping attacks targeted at the secondary users (SUs). In this case, the eavesdroppers attempt to intercept and overhear the secondary transmission without transmitting any signals.
Traditional security, which is achieved through the higher layer cryptographic authentication and identification, becomes expensive and vulnerable to attacks. Particularly, in the emerging large scale networks with high mobility terminals, the implementation and management of higher-layer key distribution face increasing challenges [6] , [7] . In other words, the establishment of the secret keys to achieve encrypted transmission in large scale decentralized networks are even more complicated and expensive than the point-to-point communications [7] . To cope with these issues, physical layer security has been proposed as a complementary security method to protect the confidential information from eavesdropping [8] . A comprehensive overview of physical layer security in multiuser wireless networks has been presented in [5] .
Recently, physical layer security has been introduced into large scale wireless networks with randomly located eavesdroppers [9] [10] [11] , single antenna legitimate nodes and eavesdroppers [7] , multiple jammers [12] , and cellular users [13] , [14] . In these works, the stochastic geometry and random graphs were applied for modeling these networks [15] . This mathematical tool is attractive since it captures the topological randomness of these networks, and provides a simple and tractable model for characterizing the performance [16] .
Various advanced techniques have been developed to enhance the secrecy performance [17] . Beamforming (BF) is proved to be the optimal transmission scheme to achieve the maximum achievable secrecy rate in multiple input single output (MISO) systems [18] . Generating artificial noise (AN) at the legitimate transmitter is proposed to be an effective technique to confound the eavesdroppers [19] . In the AN-based method, the power allocation between the information-bearing signal and the AN at the transmitter is critically important, which reveals the tradeoff between enhancing the main channel by increasing the power allocated to information-bearing signal and degrading the eavesdropper's channel by allocating more power to the AN. In [20] and [21] , the optimal power allocation strategies were studied in the conventional wireless network with fixed nodes, and wireless ad hoc networks with mobile nodes, respectively. However, all these works [18] [19] [20] [21] have considered the physical layer security in legacy networks.
Compared with the physical layer security in conventional networks, there exist several major differences in the security of CRNs: 1) the QoS requirement of the primary network needs to be satisfied; 2) the SU receiver is subject to the aggregate interference from the PU transmitters; and 3) the secondary network is more susceptible to security threats. In light of the aforementioned circumstances, the research on enhancing the security at the physical layer of CRNs has received increasing attentions. In [23] [24] [25] , the secondary user acts as a jammer to enhance the secrecy transmission of a primary network. In [26] , multiuser scheduling was proposed to improve the security level of secondary transmission with primary QoS constraint. In [27] , it was demonstrated that the best secrecy performance of secondary network can be achieved when the perfect channel state information (CSI) of all links are available. In [28] , it was proved that beamforming is the optimal transmission strategy to secure MISO CRN with the perfect knowledge of all channels. The authors of [28] then extended their work to the networks with imperfect knowledge in [29] . In [30] , the beamforming and artificial noise generation (BF&AN) was adopted at the SU transmitter to enhance the secrecy throughput of a multiple-input, single-output, multieavesdropper (MISOME) primary network. Note that [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] only considered fixed location nodes. In [31] , the secrecy capacity of cognitive radio networks with uniformly distributed secondary transmitters and primary transmitters was examined. In [32] , the secrecy capacity of the primary network was analyzed in CRNs, where PUs, SUs, and Eves followed the mutually independent homogeneous Poisson process.
Different from the aforementioned works, we treat the secrecy performance of large scale spectrum sharing networks with BF&AN at the SU transmitters. Compared against the security of non-cognitive radio networks in [21] , the prerequisite of underlay spectrum sharing networks is to guarantee the QoS of the primary network. This can be fulfilled by constraining the outage probability at the PU receiver below a predetermined threshold (i.e., the peak allowable outage probability). The use of BF&AN at the SU transmitter brings array gains at the legitimate receiver and disrupts the reception at the eavesdropper. Although BF&AN has been well treated in the conventional physical layer security network in [20] , no work has considered BF&AN in large scale spectrum sharing networks. Therefore, the question of how BF&AN impacts the security design of such a complex network remains unknown. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1) We derive a new exact closed-form expression for the maximum permissive transmit power at the SU transmitter with BF&AN. We accurately quantify the permissive transmit power region where the primary network's QoS can be guaranteed, as presented in Theorem 1. We derive Fig. 1 . A realization of a large scale spectrum sharing network model describing the received signal at a SU receiver. In this network, the green square represents the PU transmitter, the diamond represents the PU receiver, the triangle represents the SU transmitter, the circle represents the SU receiver, and the red star represents the eavesdropper. The blue solid line represents the secondary transmission, the green solid line represents the primary transmission, the blue dashed line represents the interference from the SU transmitter, and the green dashed line presents the interference from the PU transmitter.
the exact expressions for the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability of the secondary network with BF&AN at the SU transmitters, as presented in Theorems 2 and 3. 2) We show that there exists an average secrecy rate boundary beyond which the PU receiver's QoS is violated. We reveal that the optimal power allocation factor for maximizing the average secrecy rate varies for different system parameters. Equal power allocation may not achieve the near optimal average secrecy rate in large scale spectrum sharing networks. 3) To provide insights into system design from an implementation viewpoint, we compare the average secrecy rate of BF&AN with that of BF. We observe the same average secrecy rate boundary for BF&AN and BF. The advantage of BF&AN over BF on the average secrecy rate is lost, when the aggregate interference from the PU and SU transmitters is strong, such that it overtakes the effect of the generated AN. 4) We derive the asymptotic average secrecy rate and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability of the secondary network with BF&AN at the SU transmitters when the number of SU transmit antennas N s goes to infinity, as presented in Propositions 1, 2, and 3. Our asymptotic results well predict the exact performance in the medium and large N s regime. We determine the antenna gap, which showcases the number of additional antennas required to achieve the same asymptotic average secrecy rate in more dense networks.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
We consider secure communication in an underlay spectrum sharing network where the SU transmitters communicate with the corresponding SU receivers under the potential malicious attempt of multiple eavesdroppers. Each SU transmitter has N s antennas, and the remaining nodes in this model are all single-antenna nodes. As shown in Fig. 1 [33] . We assume that each PU/SU transmitter communicates with its unique associated intended PU/SU receiver at a fixed distance, respectively, in order to simplify the analysis and provide some design insights [21] , [34] , [35] . Note that this fixed distance assumption can be relaxed by taking into account the probability density distribution of the distance.
The wireless channels are modeled as independent quasistatic Rayleigh fading. The eavesdroppers interpret the secondary transmitter's signal without trying to modify it. In this complex CRNs, we consider the interference-limited case where the thermal noise is negligible compared with the aggregate interference from the other transmitters. Similar as [20] , [21] , we utilize the SIR to characterize the performance.
We mask the beamformed broadcast information with the AN at the SU transmitters to confuse the eavesdroppers. Each SU transmitter broadcasts the information-bearing signals and AN simultaneously. We assume that the perfect CSI between each SU transmitter and each SU receiver are available 1 . The AN is transmitted in the null space of the intended SU receiver's channel, thus imposing no effect on the secondary channel, whereas degrading the eavesdropper's channel. We denote the intended channel vector between the ith SU transmitter (i ∈ s ) and the corresponding SU receiver as h i,s i ∈ C 1×N s , the channel state information (CSI) of which is known at the ith SU transmitter. An 
where
s , and N s − 1 elements of n A are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and variance σ 2 n . Thus, the total transmit power per transmission P s is given by P s = P I + P A , where the power allocated to the information signal is P I = σ 2 s and the power allocated to the AN is P A = (N s − 1) σ 2 n . We also define μ as the fraction of power assigned to the information signal, thus P I = μP s .
In the primary network, we assume the typical PU receiver is located at the origin of the coordinate system, and the distance between the typical PU transmitter and its associated PU receiver is r p . According to the Slivnyak's theorem [36] , adding a probe point to the HPPP at an arbitrary location does not affect the law of the point process. The received SIR at the typical PU receiver is given by
and
In (2), α is the path-loss exponent, h p 0 is the channel fading gain between the typical PU transmitter and the typical PU receiver, h j, p 0 and X j, p 0 are the interfering channel fading gain and distance between the jth PU transmitter and the typical PU receiver, respectively. h i, p 0 ∈ C 1×N s and X i, p 0 are the interfering channel vector and distance between the ith SU transmitter and the typical PU receiver, respectively. P p is the transmit power at the PU transmitter. Note that P p I p, p 0 is the interference from other PU transmitters to the typical PU receiver, I s, p 0 is the co-channel interference from the SU transmitters to the typical PU receiver.
In the secondary network, we assume h 0,s 0 ∈ C 1×N s and r s to be the channel vector and distance between the typical SU transmitter and corresponding typical SU receiver. Note that each SU transmitter transmits the signal vector expressed as (1), we obtain the effective signal at the typical SU receiver as
The received SIR at the typical SU receiver is given by
In (6), h j,s 0 and X j,s 0 are the channel fading gain and distance between the jth PU transmitter and the typical SU receiver, respectively. h i,s 0 ∈ C 1×N s and X i,s 0 are the interfering channel vector and distance between the ith SU transmitter and the typical SU receiver, respectively. Note that P p I p,s 0 is the co-channel interference from the PU transmitters to the typical SU receiver, and I s,s 0 is the aggregate interference from other SU transmitters to the typical SU receiver.
In the eavesdropping channel, we consider the most detrimental eavesdropper that has the highest SIR for a typical SU transmitter [37] . Note that eavesdroppers are only interested in the secondary transmissions, and interpret the primary transmissions as interference 3 . We assume h 0,e k ∈ C 1×N s to be the channel vector between the typical SU transmitter and an arbitrary eavesdropper e k ∈ e . With BF&AN at the SU transmitter, the received signal from the typical SU transmitter at the kth eavesdropper is given by Lemma 1: The Laplace transform of the interference from the SU transmitters with BF&AN to the non-intended receiver I s,z is derived as
(16)
Proof: See Appendix A.
III. EXACT SECRECY PERFORMANCE
In this section, we first present the SU's permissive transmit power region. We then present the exact expressions for the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability in large scale spectrum sharing networks with BF&AN at the SU transmitters. To obtain key insights through a comparison of BF&AN with BF, we derive exact expressions for the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability in large scale spectrum sharing networks with BF at the SU transmitters.
A. Beamforming and Artificial Noise Generation 1) PUs' Quality of Service Requirement:
According to the rule of underlay spectrum sharing networks, the concurrent transmission of PUs and SUs occurs under the prerequisite that the QoS requirement of the primary transmission is satisfied [38] . As such, we first examine the transmit power operating region at the SU transmitters under the primary network's QoS constraint. The QoS of primary network is characterized that the outage probability should be no larger than the peak allowable value ρ p out , which is expressed as [39] 
where γ { p} th is the desired SIR threshold at the PU receiver. In the following theorem, we present the SU's permissive transmit power region.
Theorem 1: With BF&AN at the SU transmitter, the permissive transmit power region at the SU transmitter is given as P s ∈ (0, P max s , where
where ϒ 1 is given by (16) , and
Proof: See Appendix B. The following are some observations from (18) .
• For the fixed primary network's QoS constraint, the maximum permissive transmit power at the SU transmitter can be relaxed by reducing the distance of the typical PU transceivers r p , due to the fact that the PU can tolerate more interference from the SU transmitters.
• With increasing number of SU nodes and PU nodes per unit area, the transmit power constraint imposed on the SU transmitter is more severe. This is due to the increasing aggregate interference from the SU transmitters and the other interfering PU transmitters. To study the impact of BF&AN on the secrecy performance within the permissive transmit power region, we consider two important metrics: the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability.
2) Average Secrecy Rate: The instantaneous secrecy rate is defined as [37] 
where 
In order to examine the average secrecy rate, we derive the CDFs of SIRs at the typical SU receiver and the most detrimental eavesdropper in the following Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, respectively.
Lemma 2: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the CDF of SIR at the typical SU receiver is derived as
In (23), 2 and 3 are given by
respectively. Here, 
where l is given in (23) . Note that P s is the maximum permissive transmit power, which is given in (18) .
Proof: See Appendix D. Different from [7] and [21] where only the approximation or bound on CDF of SIR at the eavesdropper was derived, our result is derived in a simple exact closed-form expression. It is observed from (26) (26) into (21), we derive the average secrecy rate in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the average secrecy rate is derived as
where l is given in (23) . Here, P s is the maximum permissive transmit power, which is given in (18) . Note that the average secrecy rate given in (27) is applicable to arbitrary N s , μ and α.
3) Secrecy Outage Probability: The secrecy outage is declared when the instantaneous secrecy rate R se is less than the expected secrecy rate R s . As such, the secrecy outage probability is defined as [41] 
By substituting the probability density function (PDF) of γ e,AN SIR and CDF of γ s, AN SIR into (28), we derive the secrecy outage probability in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the secrecy outage probability is derived as
where l is given in (23) . Here, P s is the maximum permissive transmit power, which is given in (18). Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 Fig. 2 plots the average secrecy rate versus the SU's transmit power with various number of transmit antennas N s at the SU and power allocation factor μ, and we consider the same density for PUs, SUs, and eavesdroppers. The exact analytical curves are obtained from (27) . We find that for fixed μ = 0.4, the average secrecy rate increases with increasing N s . 3) Impact of λ s and λ p on the average secrecy rate Fig. 3 plots the average secrecy rate versus P s for various densities of PUs and SUs. We observe that there is a shift of the "average secrecy rate wall" to the left with increasing the density of PUs and SUs. This can be predicted from (18) that P max s is a decreasing function of λ p and λ s . As expected, the average secrecy rate decreases with increasing the density of SUs and PUs, due to the increased aggregate interference from the SUs and the PUs. 4) Optimal μ for the average secrecy rate Fig. 4 plots the average secrecy rate versus μ for various densities of eavesdroppers λ e . Here, we use the maximum permissive transmit power to transmit the signal from SU, which is given by (27) , and we set P s = P max s and ρ { p} out = 0.1. The triangles represent the maximum achievable average secrecy rate. For the scenarios where the density of eavesdroppers is higher than the density of SUs, the average secrecy rate first increases and then decreases with increasing μ. An optimal power allocation factor μ * exists at which the maximum average secrecy rate is achieved. For the region μ < μ * , we see that increasing the power allocated to the useful signal ensures more message delivery (increasing C su ) and plays a dominant role in improving the average secrecy rate; for the region μ > μ * , reducing the power allocated to the AN increases C E , and thus degrades the average secrecy rate. We conclude that a tradeoff exists between increasing the capacity of secondary channel and decreasing the capacity of eavesdropping channel. Interestingly, we see from Fig. 4 that μ * varies for different λ e . We find that less power should be allocated to the AN for a network with less dense eavesdroppers. Out of expectation, the equal power allocation may not be a good strategy to achieve the maximum average secrecy rate.
B. Numerical Examples for BF&AN

1) Average Secrecy Rate Boundary
5) Impact of density ratio on the optimal μ
To better illustrate the relationship between the optimal power allocation factor and the density of SUs and eavesdroppers. We first define the ratio between λ e and λ s as ε = λ e /λ s . In Fig. 5 , we plot μ * versus the density ratio ε. We set P s = P max s , λ s = 10 −3 m −2 , and λ p = 10 −4 m −2 . We find that 1) The power allocated to AN should be increased with increasing the density ratio between the eavesdroppers and the SUs ε to achieve the optimal average secrecy rate; 2) For extremely low density ratio ε, all of the power should be allocated to information signal without injecting AN to achieve the maximum average secrecy rate. This reveals that improving the information delivery is more important than combating the eavesdropping in this scenario. 6) Impact of N s and α on the secrecy outage probability Fig. 6 plots the secrecy outage probability versus μ for various number of antennas at SU transmitter N s . The exact analytical curves are obtained from (29) , which are well validated by Monte Carlo simulations. We assume . In this setting, we see that the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing μ, and when μ approaches 1, the lowest secrecy outage probability is achieved. This is because when the density of eavesdroppers is small compared to that of SU, the effect of delivering information overtakes the effect of combating the eavesdropping. As expected, the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing N s , which is due to the array gains brought by additional antennas.
C. Numerical Examples for the Comparison Between BF&AN and BF
In this subsection, we compare the secrecy performance of our proposed network with BF&AN to that with BF, and examine the potential benefits of AN on the secrecy performance. Note that BF can be viewed as a special case of BF&AN with μ = 1. In Fig. 7(a) and Fig. 7(b) , we plot the operational achievable average secrecy rate region for the large scale spectrum sharing network with BF&AN and BF. We see the same permissive transmit power region for BF&AN and BF in each figure. This is because, from the typical PU receiver's perspective, both AN and the information signal transmitted from SU are viewed as interference, which is equivalent to the case of BF. In both figures, we notice that the same unachievable average secrecy rate region located in P s ∈ (0, 30) dBm with P p ∈ (0, −30) dBm. This can be explained by the fact that the QoS constraint is severely violated in this setting when the aggregate interference is much higher compared to the useful signal received at PU.
In contrast to the fact that it is often beneficial to emit AN on top of the information-bearing signal in the physical layer security model with fixed nodes [42] , we see from Fig. 7(a) that BF outperforms BF&AN or has the same performance as BF&AN in all operational region. This is because the strong aggregate interference from the PUs overtakes the effect of the AN generated by SU. In this case, more power needs to be allocated to transmit information signal at SUs to contend with the interference from PUs. Interestingly, Fig. 7(b) shows that BF&AN outperforms BF in some regions, owing to the fact that the effect of AN generated by SU overtakes the relatively low aggregate interference from PUs. In this case, more power should be allocated to transmit AN to disrupt the eavesdropping.
IV. LARGE ANTENNA ARRAYS ANALYSIS
In this section, we study the asymptotic secrecy performance of the large scale spectrum sharing networks where the SU transmitters are equipped with large antenna arrays. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability, when the number of antennas at the SU transmitters goes to infinity.
We first present the Lemma 4 based on the law of large numbers as follows:
Proof: This is due to the fact that
By using Lemma 4, we rewrite the SIR at the typical PU in (2) as
(32) For large N s , the SIR at typical SU is given as
From (33), we find that the received SIR at typical SU scale by N s . For large N s , the SIR at the most detrimental eavesdropper is given as
Based on the SIR at the typical PU in (30) , with the help of the Laplace transform in [43, eq. (8)], and similar method provided in the proof for the Theorem 1, we present the permissive transmit power region at the SU transmitter at large N s in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the permissive transmit power region for the SU transmitter at large N s is given as P s ∈ (0, P max s , where
and is given by (19) .
To facilitate the analysis of the average secrecy rate and the secrecy outage probability, we need to first derive the asymptotic CDFs of γ 
To derive the asymptotic CDF of γ s,∞ SIR , we first present
In (43), f I sec,∞ (x) is the inverse Laplace transform of L I sec,∞ (s), which can be expressed as
(s).
Due to the intractability of this inverse Laplace transform, some alternative ways have been proposed, such as using numerical inversion to evaluate L −1 I sec,∞ (s) [44] , or the log-normal approximations to approximate f I sec,∞ (x). However, in our case, there exists singularity at X i,s i = X j,s 0 = 0, thus the mean and variance of I sec,∞ derived from the moment generating function diverge [14] , [45] , which renders the derivation of the PDF of I sec,∞ . Alternatively, we utilize the Gil-Pelaez theorem [46] to facilitate the derivation of the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU in the following lemma.
Lemma 5: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU at large N s is given as
, and ϕ (w) is the conjugate of the characteristic function, which is given by
Since we can not derive the closed form expression for the general form for the PDF of I sec,∞ , we present the special case for the path loss component α = 4. In the following corollary, we derive the asymptotic CDF of SIR for the typical secondary user with α = 4.
Corollary 1: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters and α = 4, the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU is derived as 
Note that our derived asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU for α = 4 is in exact closed-form.
A. Average Secrecy Rate
Based on the CDF of SIR at the most detrimental eavesdroppers in (41) and the CDF of SIR at the typical SU in (45), we derive the general case of the asymptotic average secrecy rate using (21) in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the asymptotic average secrecy rate at large N s is derived as
Having (41) and (47), we derive the asymptotic average secrecy rate for the special case of α = 4 in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters and α = 4, the asymptotic average secrecy rate at large N s is derived as
B. Secrecy Outage Probability
We then turn our attention to the asymptotic secrecy outage probability. We take the derivative of the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the most detrimental eavesdroppers in (41) , and substitute it with the asymptotic CDF of SIR at the typical SU in (47) into (28), to yield the general case of the asymptotic secrecy outage probability in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability at large N s is derived as
Based on (47), we derive the secrecy outage probability for α = 4 as a special case in the following corollary.
Corollary 3: With BF&AN at the SU transmitters and α = 4, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability at large N s is derived as
C. Numerical Examples for the Asymptotic Secrecy
Performance of BF&AN Fig. 8 plots the asymptotic average secrecy rate of large scale spectrum sharing networks with BF&AN for various power allocation factor μ and λ s . We assume P s = P max s . The analytical results of asymptotic secrecy rate plotted using (49) are in precise agreement with the simulation points of asymptotic secrecy rate. It is also shown that the asymptotic average secrecy rate converges to the exact average secrecy rate at large N s .
We observe that the average secrecy rate increases with increasing N s . This can be indicated by (33) that the received SIR at the typical SU proportionally increases with μN s . For the same μ, to achieve the same average secrecy rate, there exists antenna gaps between the curves with different density of SU. This antenna gap quantifies how many additional antennas needed to be employed at the SU transmitter to achieve the same average secrecy rate when the network double its density of SU. Fig. 9 plots the asymptotic secrecy outage probability versus N s . The analytical results of asymptotic outage probability plotted using (51) are in precise agreement with the simulation points of asymptotic outage probability. Furthermore, the asymptotic secrecy outage probability converges to the exact secrecy outage probability at large N s . We see that the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing N s , due to the increase of the array gains at the SU receiver. We also see that the secrecy outage probability decreases with increasing μ, which reflects that for the scenario with relatively less dense eavesdroppers, more power should be allocated to transmit useful information to the SU receiver for the information delivery enhancement.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we considered secure communication in large scale spectrum sharing networks in the presence of multiple non-colluding eavesdroppers. We employed beamforming and artificial noise generation (BF&AN) at the SU transmitters to achieve secure transmission against malicious eavesdroppers. We obtained an exact expression for the average secrecy rate, through which we observed the average secrecy rate boundary. We also derived an exact expression for the secrecy outage probability. Interestingly, our results show that to achieve the optimal average secrecy rate, more power should be allocated to AN with increasing the density ratio between the eavesdroppers and the SUs; whereas for extremely low density ratio, all of the power should be allocated to information signal without injecting AN. Moreover, we derived the asymptotic average secrecy rate and the asymptotic secrecy outage probability as the number of antennas at the SU transmitters grows large to showcase the large gain brought to the secrecy performance.
APPENDIX A A PROOF OF LEMMA 1 Consider a HPPP s with density λ s , the aggregate interference from the SU transmitters is given by
The Laplace transform of I s,z is
Applying the Generating functional of HPPP in [36] and the polar-coordinate system, we have
Then we turn our attention to derive the expectation of W s i ,z . According to [47] and [21] , h 0,z
, and
Taking the expectation of W s i ,z by using By utilizing similar approach in Appendix A of [34] and based on Lemma 1, we derive the outage probability at the typical PU receiver as where l is given in (23) . Now, we apply the Faà di Bruno's formula to solve the derivative of mth order as follows: By substituting (C.7) into (C.5), we get the closed-form expression for the CDF of SIR at the typical secondary user as (22 (26) .
